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Abstract
The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a 
group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and 
thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned 
NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. 
However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting 
the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the “New Cold Warriors” 
(Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the “Pragmatics” (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership 
states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic 
missile shield, is not a genuine “New Cold Warrior”, while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.
KEY WORDS:
Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE), NATO, European Union, foreign policy initiatives, 
Ukrainian crisis, Russia
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Introduction and methodology
The post-communist NATO members studied here are located in Central 
Europe (also known as “New” Central Europe: hence, in this context, the term 
designates those post-communist states in the region, so it does not refer to 
Germany, Austria or Switzerland) and South-Eastern Europe, respectively. 
When discussing the communist past and the post-communist present day, 
these two regions can be perceived as a single, connected area, and 
referred to as Central and South-Eastern Europe (hereafter, CSEE), albeit 
they possess significant differences which mainly arise from the different 
paths that the CSEE states took in the 1990s. The present economic and 
institutional crisis has hit the European Union hard (and some of its member 
states in particular, especially the Baltic states and the Southern members 
plus Ireland, often referred to as the PIIGS — Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain — while Croatia has suffered the longest, with a six-year recession 
and/or stagnation). When the current migration crisis and the deterioration of 
relations with Russia, as well as Brexit and the terrorist threats hitting both NATO 
and the EU member states are added, this all points to a multi-fold crisis in the 
EU. Parts of the studied states from CSEE are showing commonalities in their 
attitude towards the migration crisis and the relations of national authorities 
towards the EU (particularly the states of the Visegrad Group). Concurrently, 
different states of the region are showing differences in their stance towards 
Russia and their interest/attitude towards the Eastern Partnership states in 
general. The group of post-communist NATO member states studied here is 
comprised of 13 states, of which two can be characterized as medium-sized 
European states (Poland and Romania) and the other eleven referred to as 
more or less small European states (of these states, only the Czech Republic 
has a population of more than 10 million, and the smallest studied state is 
Montenegro, with a population of about 600 thousand).
All of these states have some important features in common, which are 
referred to as common denominators:
• They are post-communist NATO member states.
• Eleven out of the thirteen studied states are both NATO and EU 
members.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
63
• Most of the analysed states can be referred to as small. This affects 
their foreign and defence policy capabilities, as well as their 
behaviour in the international environment.1
• None of these states joined the EU before 2004, with Romania and 
Bulgaria joining at the beginning of 2007 and Croatia in 2013 (so 
these are all still “newer” members).
• All of the studied states are more or less dependent on energy 
imports (and some of them are especially dependent on gas imports 
from Russia, mostly via transit states Ukraine and Belarus).2
• The region has, especially in the last decade, and more intensely 
since the Ukrainian crisis, become a theatre for testing of the Western 
response to the renewed Russian economic and political influence.
• The Visegrad Group represents the core states of “new” Central 
Europe, or Rumsfeld’s “New Europe”, whose members support 
a stronger role of national governments in the EU and oppose 
the acceptance of refugees as an example of the supranational 
authorities’ will imposed on national governments and societies, 
which neither uphold a tradition nor have a present willingness to 
accept refugees that are of different religions and cultures. Public 
opinion in the Baltic states shows similar attitudes (Lada 2015: 10). 
The gap between the “old” and “new” Europe can be seen in 
variety of issues — for example, the acceptance of refugees and 
respect for certain democratic standards. The so-called “illiberal 
democracy” pursued by the authorities of Hungary and the recent 
political developments in Poland are probably the best examples 
that confirm the tendencies in the most recent period.
• A (post-communist) history of certain initiatives and groupings 
of the studied states (see Table 1) has to be noted: the Visegrad 
Group, the Vilnius Group, “the coalition of the willing” and the 
Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Initiative. The initiatives either derive from 
the region itself or were/are sponsored from outside the region, 
1 Druláková and Přikryl (2016: 135) stated a similar claim for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The two states’ compliance 
with EU sanctions was compared.
2 In geographical terms, seven of the mentioned states are located in Central Europe. Estonia is located on the border 
between Central and Northern Europe, and Croatia is located on the border between Central and South-Eastern 
Europe. Some parts of Croatia (the Adriatic coast and the islands) geographically and culturally belong to Southern 
(Mediterranean) Europe. However, for the purposes of this paper, we consider Croatia a CSEE state. Four NATO post-
communist member states are clearly located in South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Romania.
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showing bandwagoning (towards the USA) and cooperation based 
on their rational choices (the aspirations towards NATO and EU 
membership), and certain “shared values” such as anti-communism 
and, more recently, the defence of European and Christian values 
(against non-European migrants).
Table 1: Overlapping and differences regarding various initiatives and 
informal regional groupings among the post-communist NATO/
EU member states (and neighbouring small states) in CSEE
Visegrad 
Group
Vilnius Group (plus 
supporters of the 
attack on Iraq 
already in NATO)
Baltic-Adriatic 
and Black Sea 
Initiative (the 
ABC Initiative)
New Cold 
Warriors Pragmatics
Poland Poland Poland Poland Hungary
Czech 
Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Estonia Slovakia
Hungary Hungary Hungary Latvia Slovenia
Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Lithuania Bulgaria
Estonia Estonia Romania Czech Republic?
Latvia Latvia Croatia
Lithuania Lithuania
Slovenia Croatia
Romania Slovenia
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia Bulgaria
Albania
Macedonia
 
Two informal groupings, made up of NATO/EU members in the region, can 
be differentiated for analytical purposes based on their stance towards 
Russia, for the purpose of this paper referred to as “New Cold Warriors” 
and “Pragmatics”. There are three main features that differentiate the 
two groups:
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1. In the group of “New Cold Warriors”, not only is the political elite 
predominantly anti-Russian and vigorously supportive of the 
independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but the public 
holds a similar opinion, especially in Poland and the Baltic states. 
According to the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends 
survey (2015), 78 per cent of Poles support economic aid to Ukraine, 
77 per cent support sanctions against Russia and 67 per cent support 
helping Ukraine even if it heightens the risk of conflict with Russia 
(Fuksiewicz and Łada 2015: 4–5).
2. The willingness to contribute more to defence spending (see Table 
2), host the anti-ballistic missile shield and demand permanent 
stationing of NATO troops on their territory. Because of the difference 
in geostrategic position and the degree of negative views towards 
Russia, the “Pragmatics”, in comparison to the “New Cold Warriors”, 
although NATO members as well, would be expected to be less 
willing to make efforts to narrow the gap between their actual 
defence spending and recommendations (a euphemism for the 
requirements of NATO: two per cent of GDP). It is therefore interesting 
to observe the defence spending of studied states since 2013, a 
year before 2014, which already seems to be one of the landmark 
years in NATO’s history due to the events in Ukraine.
3. A staunch pursuit of the diversification of energy supply routes, 
with Poland and Croatia as forerunners and the Baltic states as 
supporters. The most important proposal in this initiative is that of 
a gas pipeline from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, which would 
originate at the proposed (planned) LNG terminal at the Croatian 
island of Krk, which could be supplied with gas from far away fields, 
primarily located in the USA and Qatar. Although it seems like a 
distant future, this plan shows the determination of some CSEE states 
to lower the dependence on Russian gas. However, the Pragmatics 
are concurrently still willing to develop the South Stream pipeline 
with Russia, which would be especially interesting to Bulgaria 
and Hungary (they are making efforts to diversify supply routes of 
Russian gas — hence they want to avoid transit through Ukraine 
as much as possible), while the New Cold Warriors are eager and 
very determined to radically decrease the level of dependence on 
Russian gas.
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Table 2: Defence spending of studied NATO member states 2014–2016 
(percentage of GDP, based on 2010 prices)
NATO member states (ordered by the level of their 
contribution in 2016) 2013 2014 2015 2016
Estonia 1.90 1.94 2.07 2.16
Poland 1.72 1.85 2.23 2.00
Lithuania 0.76 0.88 1.14 1.49
Romania 1.28 1.35 1.45 1.48
Latvia 0.93 0.94 1.04 1.45
Bulgaria 1.46 1.32 1.29 1.35
Croatia 1.47 1.41 1.37 1.23
Albania 1.41 1.34 1.16 1.21
Slovakia 0.99 0.99 1.14 1.16
Czech Republic 1.03 0.96 1.06 1.04
Hungary 0.95 0.87 0.94 1.01
Slovenia 1.06 0.98 0.94 0.94
 
Source: Defence expenditures of NATO countries, 2009–2016 (2016). 
Table 2 clearly shows that the New Cold Warriors were willing to spend 
more on defence even before 2014 (Estonia, Poland and, to a lesser 
degree, Romania) or have, in relative terms, increased their defence 
spending far more than other studied states (Latvia and especially 
Lithuania). Compared to 2013 and 2014, by 2016, the Pragmatics had 
raised their defence spending much less than the New Cold Warriors, 
while some NATO members from the CSEE had even reduced it (Albania, 
Croatia and Slovenia).
Hence the focus of this paper is on the foreign policy initiatives and 
activities of NATO member states from CSEE regarding mainly their 
relations with Russia and the Eastern Partnership states. It is important to 
identify the most important issues that influence these activities: 
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1. The political relations with Russia;
2. Strategic military issues, such as the deployment of NATO troops and 
heavy weaponry, as well as the anti-ballistic missile shield;
3. The (geo)-economic relations with Russia, particularly energy (gas) 
supply issues, clearly tied to Russia: hence most of these states are 
dependent on Russian gas imports, which in some cases reaches 
almost 100 per cent of overall gas supply.
The main contribution of this paper is to study two groups of NATO/EU 
members from the CSEE in terms of their foreign policy initiatives and 
compliance with NATO and EU policy towards Russia in the last three 
years after the evolution of the Ukrainian crisis. Some of the “aberrations” 
in compliance of some of the studied states were visible earlier: analysis of 
data from the ECFR Scorecard for the 2012–2016 period and examination 
of data about the relevant economic indicators were used to study the 
influence of the most recent economic crisis and the dependence on 
gas supply from Russia on the studied states’ compliance with the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The periodical document called the ECFR Scorecard (hereafter 
Scorecard) was used as a source of data and a pointer in analysis of 
foreign policy activities (initiatives, as well as non-compliance with ESDP) 
of the studied states that were NATO and EU members. The data on 
foreign policy leadership roles and “slackers” for each state were taken 
from the Scorecard and analysed for the years 2012–2016. The data from 
the 2016 Scorecard were analysed separately because for each area 
only two indicators were shown in the data sheet for the states, in contrast 
to four, five or even six indicators for each of the areas in the previous 
years analysed. The Scorecard should only be considered as an overview 
and a pointer that could direct us to certain conclusions. The intention 
of the paper is not to analyse the overall complexity of Russia-NATO or 
Russia-CSEE relations, or the relations between particular CSEE states and 
Russia and/or Eastern Partnership states.
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Central and South-Eastern Europe: commonalities 
in the pre-1990s, differences in the 1990s, and 
similarities and differences in the present day
All of the states mentioned here, except Croatia, Montenegro and 
Slovenia, belonged to the Warsaw Treaty Organization until its dissolution 
in 1991, or were more isolated and communist than the members of this 
organization (Albania, which actually left the Treaty in 1968). Half of the 
states did not even possess formal independence (Slovenia, Montenegro 
and Croatia were parts of socialist Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia formed Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were part of 
the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, the independence of all these states, 
whether they formed formally independent states (Poland, Hungary and 
Bulgaria) or showed a significant level of foreign policy independence — 
whether nationalistic (Romania during Ceausescu, especially since 1968), 
or isolationist and Stalinist-style (Albania under Enver Hoxha) or were 
part of the multinational communist federations — was merely a fiction, 
which was particularly proved by military interventions in Hungary (1956), 
Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1981).
Sztompka (2004) pointed out that the collapse of the Communist regime 
changed the boundaries. Nevertheless, this change only shifted the 
curtain to the East, strengthening the dividing line between the new 
Central Europe and the Western Balkans, and the Post-Soviet space in 
Europe (excluding the Baltic states).
In the 1990s, Central Europe was able to take a more stable and European 
integration-oriented path than the post-communist states of South-Eastern 
Europe, and especially post-Yugoslav states (except Slovenia). The states 
of the Visegrad Group plus the Baltic states and Slovenia managed to 
significantly increase their GDP, up to the level of middle-income states, 
and were accepted into NATO (1999 or 2004) and into the EU (2004).
Hamilton (2013: 303) pointed out the crucial role of NATO enlargement in 
the CSEE states: “During the 1990s and for most of the 2000s, US relations with 
Central and East European states advanced primarily through the prism 
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of NATO, with other elements playing a not so important part as strategic 
relations.” The expression of these relations was clear bandwagoning, to 
a greater or lesser degree, of the CSEE states towards the USA.
The Visegrad Four comprises the foremost and the oldest post-communist 
grouping of the four states from the region (initially three, before 
Czechoslovakia was dissolved). The Visegrad Four, comprised of the core 
states of the region, is the most homogenous grouping of the states from 
the region, with common interests and goals. Belkin et al. (2014: 289) 
emphasize that members of the Visegrad Four “generally consult closely 
with one another in attempting to present a unified regional stance within 
NATO and on issues related to the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)”. However, as Fawn (2013: 340) points out, the group has not 
always been so homogeneous: “It has faced inordinate challenges, and, 
for varying reasons, has even been pronounced dead, and not once but 
several times”.
The Vilnius Group comprises ten (then) aspirant NATO and EU states, of 
which eight have been successful in fulfilling these goals (Albania has been 
a NATO member state since 2009; only Macedonia is not a member of 
either organization). Most of the Vilnius Group states (except Croatia and 
Slovenia) joined the “coalition of the willing”. This foreign policy strategy 
is a good example of bandwagoning, aligning with the most powerful 
state in NATO and thus acknowledging that the US vote is decisive when 
decisions on NATO enlargement are being made. This group of states 
displayed a strong pro-US and pro-NATO stance in 2003, but later not all of 
them decided to participate in the intervention against the Iraqi regime.
The most recent grouping comprising CSEE states is the Adriatic-Baltic and 
Black Sea (ABC) Initiative. The official main goals of the ABC Initiative, 
in the words of the Croatian Madam President, are cooperation in the 
fields of energy, transport and economy: “The Baltic-Adriatic and Black 
Sea Initiative would comprise states in the same geographical area, from 
Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea, most of which are small. With the 
inclusion of Austria, the Initiative is trying to overcome the ‘Iron Curtain’ 
and the gap between the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe ” (Newsletter 2015: 2).
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Central and South-Eastern Europe: A revived 
“battlefront region” between NATO and Russia
The events in Ukraine, which evolved into a full-scale regime change, 
showed both deep divisions inside this state and the strategic importance 
of Ukraine to Russia, which has, in the last two decades, more than once 
noted which issues represent “red lines” for its vital strategic interests. As 
Ruehle (2014: 234) pointed out, the crisis in Ukraine marked a new low in 
NATO-Russia relations: “While this relationship had been deteriorating for 
quite some time, Moscow’s role in the Ukraine crisis revealed a geopolitical 
agenda that caught many observers by surprise.”
However, the events of 2014 in Ukraine could probably have been 
forecasted, as the NATO-Russia relationship had been deteriorating prior 
to 2014 for some time. The events from 2008 have to be remembered, when 
the Five-Day War in Georgia stalled the prospect of NATO enlargement 
to the East for some time. Russia clearly showed where the “red lines” 
were laid: “Since the Georgia-Russia war, NATO leaders have not been 
as quick or assertive to counter Russian anti-enlargement rhetoric as they 
were previously” (Wolff 2015: 1110).
Nevertheless, if we return a little further to the past, at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2005, Russian President Putin had already said that he 
considered the break-up of the USSR to be “the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the twentieth century”. That statement opened the space for 
analysing what the realization of the so-called “Putin doctrine” might bring in 
the future (Kazantsev and Sakwa 2012: 290); as Bennett (2015: 1) pointed out, 
“Putin has repeatedly alleged that the West has maintained a containment 
policy toward Russia since the 18th century; the Western reaction to events 
in Ukraine is merely the present manifestation of this policy”.
Therefore, the present day hostility of Russia towards NATO, as well as mutual 
fears, distrust and pressures, have been building up for approximately a 
decade. Additionally, these trends can be perceived as a continuance 
of mutually distrustful relations from the second half of the 1990s, when the 
first NATO Post-Cold War enlargement was proposed and prepared. More 
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than two decades ago, at the end of 1994, the document titled Study on 
NATO Enlargement met with staunch opposition from Russia. Nevertheless, 
NATO pursued its own course of action until 2008, enlarging continuously, 
and inviting Croatia and Albania to join at the Bucharest Summit in April 
2008, four months before the Five-Days War. Forsberg and Herd (2015: 42) 
conclude that the acknowledgement of difficulties in the Russia-NATO 
relationship prior to the Ukrainian crisis does not mean that the break-up 
of the institutional partnership between Russia and NATO was inevitable 
and was bound to happen. Drawing a conclusion on the nature of 
difficulties in NATO-Russia relations, Krickovic (2016: 176–177) pointed out: 
“Despite the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War, Russia 
and the West have failed to establish binding institutional arrangements.” 
It is true that NATO stalled its enlargement to post-communist states until 
2017. However, it recently accepted Montenegro as its newest member, 
despite fierce opposition from Russia. Ukraine has recently changed its 
legal framework in order to be able to make initial steps towards NATO 
membership. This proves that the geopolitical ambitions of NATO have not 
been forestalled indefinitely — on the contrary, they have been revived.
Whether the claim about NATO’s promises after the German unification — 
the so-called no-expansion pledge — is true or not (Wolff 2015: 1104), the 
facts remain that NATO has spread to parts of the former geopolitical East 
and that Russia has had a problem with that ever since the developments 
started. Consequently, ever since the post-communist states of Central 
and Eastern Europe — and, a bit later, of South-Eastern Europe — joined 
NATO and then the EU, Russia has been searching for ways to re-establish its 
influence. This process has been parallel to the process of Russia’s economic, 
military and political rising, and evolved concurrently with the Putin era. 
Influence through investments into the energy sectors of the aforementioned 
states, economic ties, loans, political connections with some South-Eastern 
European states (Serbia particularly) etc. have been the means of Russia’s 
renewed geo-economic influence, which translates the attempts to reach a 
strategic parity with the USA in the region, although most of the states in the 
region are NATO and EU member states. It was obvious that once these states 
were accepted into NATO/the EU, their strategic and economic positions 
would be clearly defined, and although there can be slight deviations from 
the common policies, it is unlikely that a certain state would leave the NATO/
EU bloc to join some Russia-led or sponsored association.
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From the perspective of core NATO members, newer NATO members’ 
accession represents a spreading of the zone of security and stability, 
liberal norms and values, as well as the market economy, gaining strategic 
footholds in the former Soviet Eastern Europe. From a Russian perspective 
— and contrary to its fears about NATO expansion and aggression on 
its borders and its proximity — Russia is facing objectively weaker NATO 
member states (newer, and former Warsaw Treaty members or the former 
Soviet Republics) that can be more easily coerced. Without firm NATO 
support, these states (even Poland) do not stand a real chance in any 
kind of standoff with Russia. Their possibilities of action within NATO are also 
limited if their agenda is not important enough to the USA and the Europe’s 
Big Three in NATO (the United Kingdom, France and Germany): “The newer 
members of NATO—states that directly experienced both Russian and 
Soviet occupation and hegemonic policies—are apprehensive about this 
forceful new Russia that does not hesitate to advance neo-colonial claims 
and practise cyberattacks and energy cut-offs” (Rachwald 2011: 122–123).
The problem for NATO in its reactions towards Russia in the Georgian and 
Ukrainian crisis lies in the ambivalence of its goals and instruments used. 
NATO no longer bases its actions on realistic perceptions of international 
relations, in which the relations with Russia should be perceived as relations 
between two centres of military and political power. Prior to the Ukrainian 
crisis, NATO perceived international relations in a more functional sense, 
similar to the EU, and has itself become a functional component of 
international relations. Due to the Russian actions in Ukraine, NATO had 
to cancel its future proclaimed mission and return to its original mission/
reason for existence (Teutmeyer 2014: 432).
Variety in responses to the Russian actions in 
Ukraine among NATO member states from CSEE
Regarding the strategic and political relations, the situation in Eastern Europe 
in mid-2017 is probably the worst since the end of the Cold War. Russian 
ambitions are realized, for now: “the Russian flag still flies over Simferopol, the 
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capital of Crimea; the conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region is now Europe’s 
latest and greatest frozen conflict” (Conley 2015: 28). Forbrig (2015: 1) states 
that the Russian actions in Ukraine have challenged the architecture, rules 
and institutions of post-Cold War European security. The failure of European 
policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood was exposed.
However, the differences among NATO member states from the CSEE 
— even the members of the Visegrad Four — have started to blur after 
the events in Ukraine and the Russian annexation, despite the fact that 
the Visegrad Four have condemned the Russian aggression and stated 
their support for Ukraine. The Baltic states have also condemned Russian 
action in the Crimea and, later, in Eastern Ukraine. Despite the unanimity 
of NATO (and EU) member states about the illegality of Russian actions in 
Ukraine and withholding economic sanctions against Russia, exceptions 
and differences exist.
The group of New Cold Warriors is formed of a hard anti-Russian core, 
with strong anti-Russian and anti-communist rhetoric, comprised 
primarily of Poland and the Baltic states, whose public opinion is also 
strongly opposed to Russia and in favour of Ukraine. Balabán (2016: 
96) pointed out that at the Welsh Summit, Poland and the Baltic states 
demanded the establishment of permanent military bases. On the 
other hand, Germany, Italy and France rejected the suggestion. 
Romania was included in the New Cold Warriors mostly because of its 
willingness to host the anti-ballistic missile shield, which Russia perceives 
as a threat to its national security, and its condemnation of the illegal 
annexation of Crimea and the revisionist policy of Russia. The Czech 
Republic, although hosting a part of the anti-ballistic missile shield, 
which Russia perceives as a strategic asset targeted against itself, 
has been sending mixed signals regarding the issue of Ukraine and, 
consequently, NATO-Russia relations. While the social-democratic 
government was pretty firm in its condemnation of Russia’s actions 
and its support of Ukraine and NATO, while respecting the importance 
of Russia as an important economic and political partner to the Czech 
Republic (of which Russia is a key non-EU economic partner) and the 
entire EU, President Zeman led a somewhat different policy (Groszkowski 
2015a). Due to the policy of the Croatian Madam President, who 
initiated the ABC Initiative with the Polish President Duda, oriented 
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towards decreasing energy dependence on Russian gas, and recent 
statements made by the Croatian Prime Minister Plenković about 
the Ukraine issue, which Russia perceived as anti-Russian, as well as 
the US weapons that have recently been donated to the Croatian 
Armed Forces, Croatia has effectively become a part of the anti-
Russian core. The Croatian position may likely be influenced by the 
recent Russian re-armament of Serbia. Croatia is not strategically as 
important to either Russia or NATO as the other aforementioned states 
of the hard anti-Russian core. Therefore, the current Croatian policy 
towards Russia is a policy of choice and compliance with the goals 
of NATO, and not of the utmost need for defence. Actually, it can be 
described as an example of anti-pragmatism and effective shattering 
of the possibilities for future economic cooperation with Russia, an 
important and specific market, where Croatian firms (construction 
firms, as well as exporters of industrial and agricultural products) have 
traditionally been present.
Besides demanding (on several occasions) more permanent NATO 
troop deployment (Sytas 2015) and reconnaissance flights, Poland 
and the Baltic states especially have even asked NATO to focus its 
missile shield on Russia (Euractiv 2014). Besides security issues, the 
Baltic states have problems with Russia that derive from the Soviet 
period and comprise significant Russian minorities, which opens room 
for irredentism and increases the chances for hybrid warfare, similar to 
the Crimea scenario in 2014. On various occasions, calls were made 
for additional military exercises in the region and additional military 
assistance to the Ukrainian government. The decision to deploy more 
troops on the eastern flank of NATO was finally approved at the 
Warsaw Summit (Warsaw Summit Communique 2016). As a response 
to the NATO summit decision, Russia adopted a new doctrine, marking 
NATO’s expansion as the primary threat to itself, and enabling the 
instalment of joint missile defence systems with allied states.
The group of Pragmatics, looser than the group of New Cold Warriors 
— hence these states are also pursuing their pragmatic national 
interest besides compliance with the official policy of NATO — is 
comprised of the post-communist NATO member states that are not 
so anti-Russian oriented and are not so worried by Russian policy. This 
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fact is a product of multiple factors. Slovenia never experienced a 
period of “Soviet occupation” (as the period of “socialist republics” 
is now usually referred to in Poland and in the Baltic states). Other 
Pragmatics (Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria), despite the fact that 
they were a part of the Warsaw Treaty, do not share a direct border 
with Russia and are not so strategically important in the possible NATO-
Russia theatre of war, the Baltic. Therefore, the public opinion in these 
states is not so much anti-Russian and the pragmatism among the 
elite is more widespread. In addition, the sanctions are hurting these 
economies. It is quite clear that the Baltic states and those states 
that have agreed to host the anti-ballistic missile shield are the prime 
possible targets of Russian strategic and tactical capacities, simply 
because the military logic dictates this kind of reasoning and the 
possible actions. Different historical experience, and the difference 
in geopolitical positions, as well as the attitudes of the political elites 
shared among the Pragmatics, have influenced the development of 
their pragmatism.
Influence of the economic crisis and reliance on 
Russian gas supply on foreign policy of studied 
states towards Russia and Eastern Partnership 
states
In order to study the influence of the most recent economic crisis and 
the reliance on Russian gas supply of CSEE NATO/EU member states on 
pragmatism (or the absence of it) towards Russia in their foreign policies, 
the data on real GDP annual growth rate for the period 2008–2016 in 
percentage and unemployment in percentages for the period 2009–2014, 
October 2015 and May 2016 are shown below. The data on dependence 
of studied states on energy imports in percentages (2008–2012), data on 
the dependence of EU member states from the region on gas imports in 
percentages (2008–2012), and data on the percentage of gas imports 
from Russia in total gas imports for the studied EU member states (2012) 
are also shown. 
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Table 3: GDP per capita of post-communist NATO member states, 
indexes: 2000/1990, 2008/1990 and 2016/1990 (1990=100) and 
2008/2000, 2016/2000 (2000=100)
State
GDP 
per 
capita 
1990
GDP 
per 
capita 
2000
GDP 
per 
capita 
2008
GDP 
per 
capita 
2016
Index 
2000/
1990 
Index 
2008/
1990 
Index 
2008/
2000
Index 
2016/
1990 
Index 
2016/
2000 
Albania 639 1,193 4,423 4,147 178.2 692.2 370.7 649.0 347.6
Bulgaria 2,377 1,579 6,917 7,351 66.4 291.0 444.7 309.3 465.5
Croatia 5,185 4,862 15,694 12,090 93.8 302.7 322.8 233.2 248.7
Czech 
Republic 3,787 5,734 21,708 18,267 151.4 573.2 378.6 482.4 318.6
Estonia n/a 4,063 17,786 17,575 n/a n/a 437.8 n/a 432.6
Hungary 3,186 4,543 15,365 12,665 142.6 482.3 338.2 397.5 278.8
Latvia 2,796 3,309 15,464 14,118 118.3 553.1 467.3 504.9 426.7
Lithuania 2,841 3,267 14,775 14,880 115.0 520.1 452.2 523.8 455.5
Poland 1,694 4,477 13,886 12,372 264.3 819.7 310.1 730.3 276.3
Romania 1,651 1,662 9,949 9,474 100.7 602.6 598.6 573.8 570.0
Slovak 
Republic 2,211 5,330 18,201 16,496 241.1 823.2 341.5 746.1 309.5
Slovenia 8,699 10,045 27,015 21,305 115.5 310.6 268.9 244.9 212.1
 
Source: World Bank (2017).
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Table 4: GDP growth rate of Central and South-Eastern Europe NATO 
member states in percentages 2008–2016
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania 7.5 3.4 3.7 2.5 1.4 1.0 1.8 2.6 n/a
Bulgaria 5.8 -5.0 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 3.6 3.4
Croatia 2.1 -7.4 -1.7 -0.3 -2.2 -0.9 -0.4 1.6 2.9
Czech Republic 2.7 -4.8 2.3 2.0 -0.8 -0.7 2.0 4.5 2.4
Estonia -5.3 -14.7 2.5 8.3 4.7 1.6 2.1 1.4 1.6
Hungary 0.9 -6.6 0.8 1.8 -1.5 1.5 3.6 3.1 2.0
Latvia -3.2 -14.2 -2.9 5.0 4.8 4.2 2.4 2.7 2.0
Lithuania 2.6 -14.8 1.6 6.1 3.8 3.3 2.9 1.8 2.3
Poland 3.9 2.6 3.7 4.8 1.8 1.7 3.4 3.8 2.7
Romania 7.2 -6.3 -1.7 1.1 1.6 3.4 2.6 3.9 4.8
Slovak Republic 5.4 -5.3 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.4 3.8 3.3
Slovenia 3.3 -7.8 1.2 0.6 -2.6 -1.0 2.6 2.3 2.5
 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts and GDP (2016).
Figure 1: Unemployment in Central and South-Eastern Europe NATO 
member states in percentages, 2008–2014
Sources: Eurostat, Unemployment (2016); Trading Economics (2017).
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Figure 2: The dependence of studied EU member states on energy imports 
in percentages, 2008–2012
Source: European Commission (2014).
Figure 3: Dependence of EU member states from the region on gas imports 
in percentages (2008–2012)
Source: European Commission (2014).
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Figure 4: Percentage of gas imports from Russia in total gas imports for the 
studied EU member states (2012)
Source: Clingedaelenergy (2014).
The Baltic states, Bulgaria and Slovakia are obviously most dependent 
on gas imports (overwhelmingly from Russia) and are therefore the most 
vulnerable. This position is especially delicate after the outbreak of the 
Ukrainian crisis and the consequent deterioration in relations between 
NATO and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. The security of gas 
supplies from Russia for most of these states (except Romania and, partly, 
Croatia) does not only represent an economic issue: it also represents a 
national security issue. However, due to the low prices of natural gas and 
oil, Russia cannot afford not to sell; hence these low prices and sanctions 
are hurting its economy and depleting its foreign currency reserves. 
Poland is still an important transit state for Russian gas, despite the Nord 
Stream pipeline and the fact that it is anti-Russian oriented. Additionally, 
most of the states are working, more or less actively, on diversification of its 
supply routes. So, the “gas card” for Russia is working only to a point and 
only in combination with the willingness of Pragmatics from the region.
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Table 5: Common denominators for studied states: a level of relevance for 
all states (Y = yes; N = no)
Common denominator
A
lb
an
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
C
ro
at
ia
C
ze
ch
 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Es
to
ni
a
Hu
ng
ar
y
La
tv
ia
Lit
hu
an
ia
Po
la
nd
Ro
m
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
EU member since 2004 
or later N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Negative GDP growth rate 
in 2008 N N N N Y N Y N N N N N
Negative GDP growth rate 
in 2009 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Negative GDP growth rate 
split by annual positive 
GDP growth
N N N Y N Y N N N N N Y
Sustained annual 
negative GDP growth rate 
2009–2014
N N Y N N N N N N N N N
Reliance on gas imports 
from Russia more than 
50% in 2012
N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
Table 6: CSEE NATO and EU member states’ leadership initiatives, 
recognized by ECFR Scorecard 2012–2015
China Russia USA Wider Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues and 
crisis man.
Total
Bulgaria 0 2 1 0 0 2 5
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech 
Republic 1 4 2 4 0 2 13
Estonia 0 4 2 3 0 7 16
Hungary 0 2 0 3 1 1 7
Latvia 0 2 1 3 0 3 9
Lithuania 0 7 1 4 0 0 12
Poland 1 8 4 7 2 2 24
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China Russia USA Wider Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues and 
crisis man.
Total
Romania 0 5 1 2 1 0 9
Slovakia 0 2 0 7 0 3 12
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 36 12 33 4 20 107
*Albania and Montenegro were not included in the research; hence only the EU member states that are 
bound to comply with the CFSP of the EU were studied.
Source: ECFR Scorecards (2012–2015).
Table 7: CSEE NATO and EU member states’ “slackers” received by the EU, 
recognized by ECFR Scorecard 2012–2015
China Russia USA Wider Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues and 
crisis man.
Total
Bulgaria 1 1 0 0 1 3 6
Croatia 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
Czech 
Republic 1 0 1 0 3 0 5
Estonia 1 0 0 0 1 4 6
Hungary 1 2 0 0 0 2 5
Latvia 2 0 0 2 1 3 8
Lithuania 1 1 0 0 0 5 7
Poland 2 0 1 0 1 4 8
Romania 2 0 0 2 1 8 13
Slovakia 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Slovenia 1 2 0 1 0 3 7
Total 13 7 2 6 8 33 69
*Albania and Montenegro were not included in the research; hence only the EU member states that are 
bound to comply with the CFSP of the EU were studied.
Source: ECFR Scorecards (2012–2015).
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Analysis of “leaders” and “slackers” 2012–2015
Analysis has shown that all of the analysed states together had 107 
recognized leadership initiatives in the 2012–2015 Scorecards. Almost 40 
per cent of all activities were tied to the largest and the smallest states 
in the region (Poland, 37.9 million inhabitants, 24 activities; Estonia, 
1.3 million inhabitants, 16 activities). A particular initiative noted by the 
Scorecard cannot be quantified — that is, “weighed”. Therefore, the 
number of initiatives is just an indicator of the initiatives’ frequency and 
their geographical orientation, and not of their political and strategic 
importance or economic value. The EU member states from CSEE were 
mainly concerned with their own energy dependence, mostly on gas 
imports from Russia. The 69 recognized leadership initiatives (from a 
total of 107) devoted to Russia and the wider Europe region shows the 
importance and connectedness of CSEE EU member states to Russia and 
the region that lies between the EU and Russia. This is also an indicator of 
the studied CSEE states’ vulnerability to potential problems, originating in 
their Eastern neighbourhood and Russia.
The reliance on gas imports from Russia influences the foreign policy of 
the Pragmatics group. Six out of seven “slackers” (a term officially used 
in the ECFR Scorecards for reprimands received by the state from the EU) 
noted in 2012–2015 Scorecards for the analysed states cited relations with 
Russia regarding energy issues (mostly gas supply). Gyarmati (2015: 22) 
emphasized that Hungary was a key supporter of the Russian-led South 
Stream pipeline project; hence it would avoid Ukraine as a problematic 
transit state and therefore increase the security of its gas supply. Hungary 
also questioned the rationale of EU sanctions against Russia and in 
November 2014 announced that it would stop the reverse flow of gas to 
Ukraine, which was dependent on it at the time. 
Hungary’s leadership initiatives (“leaders”, five out of seven) were primarily 
oriented towards wider Europe and towards Russia. Hungary received 
“slackers” for pursuing its own “national interests” that did not necessarily 
coincide with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The 
“slackers” are not so surprising if we consider the fact that Russia remains 
Hungary’s largest trading partner outside the EU, and Hungary’s Prime 
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Minister Orban maintains very good relations with Russia.
The situation on gas supply shows the importance of this issue for the 
aforementioned states, which were obviously willing to pursue their 
national security interests, even though they did not fully comply with the 
guidelines of CFSP. However, most “slackers” (13 out of 69) received by the 
CSEE NATO/EU states are not connected with Russia and wider Europe. The 
explanation can be found in the high level of solidarity among the states 
analysed when it comes to relations with Russia and their efforts to become 
less dependent on Russia. Russia cannot lose this market, especially since 
2014, when the prices of oil have plummeted. On the other hand, these 
states did not receive “slackers” because they wanted to defy the CFSP. 
They were simply putting their national interests (gas supply) ahead of the 
particular EU policy. Almost half of the “slackers” received by the CSEE 
NATO/EU member states were in the area of multilateral issues and crisis 
management. The reluctance of these states concerning their (in)activity 
in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management can be explained 
by the lack of capability and financial constraints. 
Poland has managed to diversify its foreign policy activities, although more 
than half of its activities, and the most important ones, were connected 
with wider Europe and Russia, respectively. Poland was actually the only 
analysed state that managed to have recognized leadership initiatives in 
all six areas. None of Poland’s “slackers” were received for the relations 
with Russia and the wider Europe region. Poland’s actions towards 
its eastern neighbours and Russia are heavily influenced by historical 
experiences and geography. Long borders with Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kaliningrad Oblast, respectively, make Poland the primary frontline state 
towards Russia.
Estonia, with a population of only 1.3 million, managed to have 16 
leadership activities, mostly oriented towards the neighbouring states. 
Seven initiatives were recognized in the field of multilateral issues and 
crisis management. Two of Estonia’s initiatives were oriented towards the 
United States. It is a little surprising that such a small state managed to be so 
involved in multilateral issues far from its geographical proximity. Estonia’s 
“slackers” were received for those issues far away from its geographical 
proximity.
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Lithuania devoted almost all of its leadership activities (11 of 12) in 
2011–2014 to Russia and wider Europe. Therefore, we can conclude 
that Lithuania primarily focuses its foreign policy initiatives towards its 
neighbourhood. Lithuania received “slackers” only for activities that were 
not in its geographical proximity and of strategic importance.
Similar to Lithuania, Latvia had nine activities, of which five were oriented 
towards relations with Russia and the wider Europe region. Three were 
devoted to multilateral issues and crisis management, and one to the 
United States.
The Czech Republic showed 13 leadership roles during the analysed 
period. Four of these 13 leadership roles were oriented towards Russia. 
Another four initiatives were oriented towards wider Europe. The Czech 
Republic’s other leadership initiatives were oriented towards China, the 
United States, and multilateral issues and crisis management, respectively. 
The Czech Republic did not receive a single “slacker” for its relations with 
Russia or the wider Europe region. Kratochvil (2015: 15) emphasized that 
Czechs have become increasingly critical of Russia with the intensification 
of conflict in Ukraine: “In October 2014, two-thirds of the population said 
that Russia posed a security threat to the country, twice as many as a year 
earlier. As far as sanctions are concerned, however, the Czech public 
remains divided.”
Slovakia also oriented most of its (seven out of 12) initiatives towards the 
wider Europe region. Other initiatives were oriented towards Russia, and 
taken in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management, respectively. 
Despite its pragmatism, it is making efforts to diversify its gas supply and 
lower its dependence on Russian gas and its transit through Ukraine. It 
has also allowed reverse gas supply to Ukraine (Groszkowski 2015b). It 
has shown an incentive for gas integration with the Czech Republic and 
Austria. It is clearly led by its national interests.
Romania had nine recognized leadership activities, according to the ECFR 
Scorecard. Five of its activities were devoted to its relations with Russia. 
Two were devoted to the wider Europe region. Romania also managed 
to “collect” 13 “slackers”.
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Bulgaria showed five leadership activities, and its activities were tied to 
Russia, multilateral issues and crisis management, and the USA. Despite 
its pragmatism and interest in the South Stream pipeline, Bulgaria has 
already introduced an interconnector with Hungary, and should by 2019 
introduce one with Poland (Groszkowski 2015b).
Croatia received two “slackers”, first for relations with Russia on energy issues 
in 2014, the second for the issue of development aid and humanitarian 
aid. The period being analysed is one of the toughest economic periods 
faced by Croatia was since achieving its statehood, which is also the case 
with Slovenia. However, Slovenia managed to “collect” seven “slackers” 
from the EU. Slovenia has two main problems concerning its contribution 
and following the CFSP. It has its own national interests regarding energy 
supply (gas from Russia) (Russia Today 2015) and did not want to (or could 
not) spend more financial and material means to comply with the goals 
of the CFSP in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management.
Analysis of “leaders” and “slackers” from the ECFR 
2016 Scorecard 
Table 8: CSEE NATO and EU member states leadership initiatives, 
recognized by ECFR Scorecard 2016
State Asia and China Russia USA
Wider 
Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues 
and crisis 
management
TIS HRS SP EP TTIP AIIB UKR EUWB RR RC DHA OTD
Bulgaria 1
Croatia
Czech 
Republic 1 1
Estonia 1 1
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State Asia and China Russia USA
Wider 
Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues 
and crisis 
management
Hungary
Latvia 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 1
Poland 1 1 1
Romania 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia
 
Abbreviations: Asia and China – TIS: promotion of common EU strategy on trade and investment; HRS: 
response to China’s human rights situation. Russia – SP: maintaining a strong and united sanctions policy; 
EP: commitment to Eastern Partnership states. USA – TTIP: support for TTIP negotiations; AIIB: responding to 
the US upon joining AIIB. Wider Europe – UKR: support for Ukraine; EUWB – strengthening EU engagement 
in the Western Balkans. MENA region – RR: quelling regional rivalries in Middle East; RC – humanitarian 
response to the refugee crisis. Multilateral issues and crisis management – DHA: development and 
humanitarian aid; OTD: overseas troop deployment.
Source: ECFR Scorecard (2016).
Table 9: CSEE NATO and EU member states “slackers” received by the EU, 
recognized by ECFR Scorecard 2016
State Asia and China Russia USA
Wider 
Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues 
and crisis 
management
TIS HRS SP EP TTIP AIIB UKR EUWB RR RC DHA OTD
Bulgaria 1 1
Croatia 1 1
Czech 
Republic 1
Estonia 1
Hungary 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1 1 1
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State Asia and China Russia USA
Wider 
Europe
MENA 
region
Multilateral 
issues 
and crisis 
management
Poland 1 1 1
Romania 1 1
Slovakia 1 1
Slovenia 1
Abbreviations as for Table 8.
Source: ECFR Scorecard (2016).
The year 2015 was the most critical year so far of the present migrant 
crisis and saw continuation of heavily deteriorated relations with Russia 
due to the situation in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The activities in which 
“leaders” were recognized were mostly focused on Russia, in a positive 
sense for complying with the policies and decisions of the EU, and in a 
negative sense towards the official Russian policy and strategic interests 
of Russia. The states that were mostly engaged in these activities overlap 
with the group of New Cold Warriors. The second main area of activities in 
which the states from the region showed recognized leadership initiatives 
is wider Europe, here mostly meaning support for Ukraine (Lithuania, 
Poland and Slovakia).
When “slackers” received in 2015 by the CSEE NATO/EU member states 
are analysed, they are grouped around two areas: the MENA region, and 
multilateral issues and crisis management. Nine of eleven states received 
a “slacker” for handling the refugee crisis. The second issue on which 
the majority of the analysed EU states (except Estonia, Hungary, Latvia 
and Slovenia) from the region received a “slacker” was overseas troop 
deployment — i.e. contribution to multi-national operations. In the areas 
in which relations with Russia, wider Europe and the USA were analysed, 
no “slackers” were received.
The results from the Scorecard, though they should be taken with caution, 
show a continuance of the combination of determinants (geographical 
position, strategic situation, historical experience, as well as the overall size 
and capabilities of a particular state) and interests of a particular state 
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that define policies. The response to the migrant crisis of 2015 was certainly 
more a product of the latter than the former. Overseas troop deployment 
is a product of both. All of the studied states that showed leadership 
activity have confirmed the hypothesis that, regarding leadership activity, 
these were primarily oriented towards Russia and wider Europe. The 
results, among other conclusions, confirm that the Ukrainian crisis and its 
evolution, as well as future developments, hold a particular importance 
for the Visegrad Four. As Fawn (2013: 346) pointed out: “Ukraine is, by 
population and geography, larger than any single Visegrad country, and 
is also a lynchpin in future European security”.
The Scorecard also shows a connection between negative economic 
results and the number of “slackers” received for particular states. States 
that have experienced long periods of negative economic growth have 
not been able (or willing) to participate in multilateral issues and crisis 
management actions (such as peacekeeping missions, humanitarian and 
development aid, etc.). If seven more “slackers” received for handling 
the refugee crisis are added (treated as the MENA region issue, albeit this 
is actually primarily a multilateral and crisis management issue), it shows 
even more clearly an inability and/or unwillingness to deal with certain 
issues.
Analysis of the Scorecard has also shown a difference between Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bulgaria, and the other studied states. The three mentioned 
had fewer than half of their leadership initiatives recognized (for Slovenia 
and Croatia, there were no recognized leadership initiatives at all) 
oriented towards Russia, contrary to the other NATO/EU members from 
the CSEE. We can conclude that the small number of “slackers” received 
for relations with Russia and the wider Europe, despite the dependence 
on gas imports from Russia, shows that the NATO/EU member states from 
the region are, with some modest exceptions, following the guidelines of 
the CFSP.
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Conclusions
Some NATO member states from the CSEE, because of their geographical 
location and position that causes proximity and intense relations with wider 
Europe and Russia, as well as their reliance on gas imports from Russia, are 
in a sensitive position. If a state is almost totally dependent on gas imports 
from Russia, it has to consider its relations with Russia as a primary foreign 
policy and national security issue, despite the fact that it may have to 
follow official NATO and EU policies towards Russia. The pragmatism of the 
Pragmatics is born of need and opportunity, respectively, as is the hard 
anti-Russian stance of the New Cold Warriors, which are willing to expose 
themselves to possible Russian “gas blackmail”; hence they feel the most 
threatened by Russia, significantly more than the Pragmatics. Relations 
with Russia are still an important factor for all CSEE NATO/EU states because 
of Russia’s geographical proximity and historical connections, despite the 
fact that most of the studied states are trying to reduce their vulnerability 
towards Russia. In these efforts, the Pragmatics are the ones who are trying 
to maintain good relations with Russia, to pursue their economic interests 
and ensure their better position for the increase of trade with Russia once 
the EU abolishes the sanctions. At present, the dependence on gas 
supply from Russia does not represent a key issue that is making the most 
dependent states most willing to comply, and vice versa. The answer to 
this aberration lies in the determinants of their geographical position and 
heritage, which cannot be changed or even slightly modified. Therefore, 
the Baltic states, despite being heavily dependent on gas supplies from 
Russia, are the ones (together with Poland) that are supporting the firmest 
stance towards Russia because of the situation in Ukraine, as well as 
against its provocations and possible hybrid warfare in the Baltic region. 
The Baltic states are also actively working on reducing their dependence 
on gas supply from Russia, by developing a floating LNG terminal, 
Independence, in Lithuania (Teffer 2014), while a site in Latvia (Skulte) is also 
being developed. These investments are promoted as activities that are in 
accordance with the Third European Energy Package. The development 
of LNG terminals (like the floating one in Lithuania, the terminal in Poland 
and a prospective on the island of Krk in Croatia) is one possible way 
to reduce CSEE states’ dependence on Russian gas (Dickel et al. 2014: 
27–39). It is also one of the most important prospective endeavours of 
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the ABC Initiative. Additionally, oil and consequently natural gas have 
been relatively cheap in the last three years, driving Russia into serious 
economic problems. Therefore, Russia at present cannot use gas supply 
as a means for waging “gas wars”. Bulgaria is in a slightly different position, 
particularly due to its geographical location. It does not possess significant 
gas reserves. Bulgaria could profit from the South Stream project if it were 
ever to become functional. Historical relations with Russia and historical 
recollection are also not negative in Bulgaria as they are in Poland and 
the Baltic states.
It is obvious that differences in the stance towards Russia and the Eastern 
Partnership states exist among the studied states, which are demarcated 
in two groups. Differences can be observed in the orientation and the 
“toughness” of the stance towards Russia, as well as the relative importance 
that these issues have for particular states. The present refugee crisis and 
issues related to the role of national authorities in the EU are at the moment 
creating a wider gap than the stance towards Russia between the states 
of the Visegrad Group particularly and some other states from the region 
and the EU authorities. The Baltic states and Slovenia are also showing 
discontent when it comes to the EU authorities dealing with the refugees 
and quotas. Some NATO/EU member states from the region are simply not 
very interested in containing Russia and protecting their national borders 
with troops, and would probably want the sanctions to be lifted. This does 
not mean that NATO’s unity and resolve to act are jeopardized, especially 
because the real military capabilities of the aforementioned states, 
compared to those of Russia, are almost negligible, thereby increasing 
the homogeneity of these states’ positions and their reliance on NATO 
(primarily the USA) in security issues.
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